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Raised by an Incomes Policy 
Donald A. Nichols 
A wage stabilization program encounters many of the fundamental wage 
measurement problems that also face the Bureau of Labor Statistics and 
researchers who use wage data. Because millions of dollars are at stake in 
the administrative decisions made in an incomes program, enormous 
pressure is brought to bear to find solutions to these problems that are 
precise and simple, yet consistent. The record of  such a program, then, 
provides an interesting perspective on wage measurement issues. Can we 
measure wages when there is money on the table? Which wage measure- 
ment problems were found to be insoluble by wage stabilization author- 
ities in the past? Which definitions of  wage increase were thought by 
these authorities to be consistent enough to stand up in court? What can 
we learn from the high-priced talent that scrutinized the proposed wage 
definitions for inconsistencies? 
In this paper, I describe some of the wage measurement questions that 
arose during the Carter stabilization program of  1978-80 and the solu- 
tions to those issues that were adopted by the Council on Wage and Price 
Stability (CWPS).' Lessons for wage measurement are drawn. Many of 
these issues are also addressed in the paper by McMenamin and Russell 
(this volume) ,  though from a slightly different perspective. 
14.1  Problems with Wage Indexes 
The CWPS pay standard permitted firms to give an average pay in- 
crease of no more than 7 percent. Within large employee groups, the total 
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increase permitted by this standard could be allocated over workers in 
any way the firm chose. CWPS defined three different indexes that could 
be used to compute this average rate of wage increase. These methods 
acquired the colorful titles of the “double snapshot,” the “ice cube,” and 
the “melting ice cube.” 
The double snapshot measured wage increases by simply dividing total 
compensation by total hours at two different times and computing the 
excess of  one average over the other. The Antos paper in this volume 
describes the use of this method by the BLS in computing average hourly 
earnings. When the CWPS first proposed this index, critics noted that 
firms could evade the standard by increasing their fraction of  low-wage 
workers. In this case existing employees could all be granted increases in 
excess of  7 percent, but the average would be kept down by  adding 
low-wage workers at the bottom. On the other hand, firms expecting to 
change their employee mix toward high-wage workers felt this standard 
hurt them unduly. They might be found in violation of the standard even 
if  none of their employees received an increase over 7 percent. 
To satisfy this objection, other indexes were permitted. The ice cube 
was a fixed-weight index of  wage rates paid for specific job descriptions 
where the weights were equal to the initial distribution of  employment 
over those jobs. By definition, changes in the mix of employment could 
not affect this index since its weights were frozen at their initial levels. 
Wage levels were attached to  jobs in this index, not to  people. If  a worker 
was promoted, his increase would not be counted as long as the wage 
rates for the job he left and the job he took remained unchanged. Firms 
had asked for this treatment of promotions to be able to retain their best 
employees who might otherwise be tempted to leave by offers of promo- 
tions from other firms. 
The third  index that was permitted,  the melting ice cube, was  an 
average of the increases granted to all employees who worked for the firm 
the entire period over which the wage increase was measured. This was 
also a fixed-weight index, but here the weights were based on workers, 
not jobs. These weights were also frozen, but the components of  the 
index would melt away with employee turnover. In this index, increases 
granted for promotions had to be counted in the overall average. This 
made the melting ice cube less attractive than the ice cube for many firms. 
It was probably of greatest interest to small firms with poorly defined job 
descriptions that would have trouble distinguishing a promotion from a 
pay raise in any event. 
While CWPS called the index of worker-specific wages a melting cube 
and the index of  occupation-specific wages a plain cube, in practice, 
occupations can be discontinued (melt away) just as workers can leave a 
firm.  New  occupations  can  be  added when production methods  are 
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occupational wage index. Similarly, the wages of new employees will not 
appear in the index of  wage rates of  continuing workers. 
14.1.1  Wage Rates of  Workers or Wage Rates for Jobs 
The Antos paper notes the distinction between a worker-specific  wage 
index and a job-specific index and points out that aggregate measures of 
both concepts are published in addition to the unweighted measure of 
average hourly earnings. Antos notes that the CPS measures the wages of 
individuals while the Employment Cost Index and the BLS occupational 
wage surveys measure the wages attached to particular jobs. Which is the 
correct measure of  wages? The answer depends, of course, on the pur- 
poses of  the data. 
CWPS was forced to permit the use of a fixed-weight index of occupa- 
tional wage rates as a measure of wage increase. This seems a sensible 
decision to me, since CWPS was interested in limiting labor cost rather 
than workers’ incomes. As a measure of labor cost, what is needed is an 
index of the prices at which labor can be hired to perform specific tasks. 
These tasks are precisely defined for the occupational wage surveys 
through a set of  occupational definitions. Regardless of how the wages of 
particular individuals may vary over time, labor cost will increase or 
decrease depending on the wages that must be paid for the performance 
of the specific tasks necessary for production. In the absence of produc- 
tivity growth, an index of the wage rates paid for these tasks will capture 
changes in labor cost. 
The sample rotation  procedure  of  the  Current  Population  Survey 
provides a subset of workers whose earnings are surveyed in two succes- 
sive years or months. Their wage increases provide a sample of the wage 
increases of workers generally, whose average size may be quite different 
from the average wage increase paid for the sample of occupations noted 
above. 
A simplified illustration of  the difference between the two wage mea- 
sures is found in the concept of  a job ladder, which is a series of  steps 
through which an individual might progress in the course of  a career. 
Each step denotes a job or occupation defined by a set of assignments. 
Each step has a wage or a wage structure associated with it. Occupational 
wage statistics measure what is being paid at each rung of  the ladder. 
Occupational wage increases rise when the wage paid at a particular rung 
increases regardless of  who occupies the rung. Worker-specific wages, 
then, can change for two reasons: (1) the wage paid at the rung the 
worker occupies may change; or (2) the worker may take a step up (or 
down) the ladder to a higher (or lower) rung with a different wage. 
CWPS permitted firms to report either the average amount by which 
the wage rates on their job ladders had risen (the ice-cube method) or the 
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regardless of  their rate of  progress up the ladder (the melting ice-cube 
method). Since workers, on average, do move up the job ladder, an 
occupational index might normally be expected to increase less than the 
index of  continuing workers’ wages. 
Nevertheless,  since small firms are not  likely to have precise  job 
definitions, they may be forced to use a worker-specific index during an 
incomes program rather than a job-specific index. In small firms, work 
may be divided among existing workers according to ability. As a worker 
gains experience, more assignments may be added to his given job along 
with higher pay. Work then gets divided in a different way. This may be 
thought of as partly a promotion and partly a redefinition of the existing 
jobs.  Because  of  the difficulty of  linking the new wages to the  old 
occupations, CWPS forced such firms to use either an index of wages paid 
to existing workers or the average hourly earnings measure which is not a 
fixed-weight index at all. 
But how do  we want BLS to treat these small firms in their occupational 
wage surveys? There appears to be no alternative to reclassifying each 
job each year. While this can add an element of error to each observation, 
there is no reason to believe it adds bias. For CWPS, such a procedure 
was impractical both because the number of  firms was so much larger 
than their limited staff could handle and because the respondents’ desires 
to make the reported data come out a certain way would bias their 
response. BLS, and researchers in general, do not face the problem of 
response bias that CWPS confronted. 
The ability to use the occupational job ladder measure of wage rates for 
compliance purposes made promotions exempt from the wage standard. 
An issue similar to promotions is that of wage increases based on senior- 
ity, and these CWPS decided not to allow. At each rung of the ladder, 
there may be a whole schedule of  wage rates based on experience of 
longevity.  A  worker might normally expect to progress through this 
schedule as he rests on the rung. Should the wage increases that result 
from progressing through such a preexisting schedule also be exempt? 
That is, if  a firm raises its whole wage schedule by  exactly 7 percent, 
including all the seniority premiums associated with each step of  the 
ladder, should  it  be penalized  for noncompliance simply because its 
workers age? On the other hand, should it be able to raise its wage 
schedule by more than 7 percent if  many workers retire in a particular 
year to be replaced by junior workers at the bottom of the scale? CWPS 
answered yes to these questions by  forcing firms to include longevity 
wage increases as part of  the 7 percent permitted by the standard. This 
was done by permitting only one wage level for each job definition, with 
the original level being the average paid to all workers performing that 
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How would we want BLS to treat longevity increases when measuring 
labor cost? One issue of importance in answering this question is whether 
the seniority  premiums generally reflect greater productivity  or not. 
Medoff and Abraham (1980) found little relation between productivity 
and seniority  for white-collar employees in two  large manufacturing 
firms. If  this result is typical of all occupations at all business firms, then it 
could be  argued that seniority  increases should be  counted as wage 
increases and not simply as movements within a fixed-wage structure. 
The cost of  production would increase with wage increases based on 
seniority in this case. If, on the other hand, productivity would normally 
be  expected  to increase  along with  pay,  presumably because  of  the 
advantage of  greater experience, it would be reasonable to ignore such 
increases and treat them as a change in the mix of employees. Obviously, 
to answer this question, more research is needed on the effect of seniority 
on productivity, and this research could be directed at the implications 
for wage measurement. 
A more difficult issue is suggested by the question of why firms would 
pay  such premiums if  they  do not reflect productivity.  One possible 
answer is found in the length of  the typical employer-employee rela- 
tionship. This period’s wage payment need not reflect this period’s pro- 
duction alone but could represent, instead, an installment payment on a 
lengthy, possibly even a lifetime, contract. Japanese firms provide an 
excellent example of  this with lifetime employment for some groups of 
workers who receive quite large longevity increases. Senior workers in 
Japan can earn much more than junior workers for performing the same 
task. The treatment given seniority increases when measuring the overall 
wage increase in Japan is crucial. 
The  seniority issue is but one manifestation of the general problem that 
the traits of workers and jobs evolve over time and that the mixes of  jobs 
and workers’ capacities change as well. Generally these changes lead to 
larger wage increases as measured by  average hourly earnings than as 
measured by a fixed-weight index of  occupations. “Wage drift” is the 
term given to this difference. Drift arises because of  new occupations, 
changes in the mix of old occupations and, possibly, job downgrading. 
The last term refers to issues such as earlier promotion for people on 
career job ladders where the assigned tasks vary little with the level of the 
job. Academia provides a good example of this where earlier promotion 
to the rank of full professor could result in a higher average rate of wage 
increase for academics as a group, but that would not be reflected in an 
index of wages paid to each of the academic ranks. Indeed, because of the 
range of  salaries available at each rank, an increase in promotions can 
reduce the average rate of  pay of  both associate and full professors by 
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of full professors. This reduction in reported rates for each job could be 
accompanied by a higher average increase for each worker. 
Job downgrading may be associated with demographic cycles, or it may 
be endemic to a democratic society that promises advancement to all. It 
leads to  wage drift. It is a phenomenon we need to know more about. Are 
measureable performance standards lower today than they once were for 
given occupations?  What is the average amount of  wage drift to be 
expected in the United States? 
Human capital theory provides one way to estimate job downgrading. 
The Gollop and Jorgenson paper in this volume classifies workers by 
education, among other traits. If, over time, a particular occupation were 
occupied by workers with less and less education, one might surmise that 
this particular job was being downgraded. On average, however, because 
of the increasing percentage of the population attending college, educa- 
tion may not provide an invariable measure of  human capital. Indeed, 
educational downgrading may be taking place and this may permit- 
perhaps require--employers  to upgrade the educational requirements 
they demand of job applicants. More typical, then, might be increasing 
amounts of  human capital being found in particular occupations over 
time, if  human capital is measured by education alone. 
Over the long-run, downgrading and changes in the occupational mix 
can lead to quite different estimates of the overall rate of wage increase, 
depending on whether the wage rates surveyed are those associated with 
specific tasks, those associated with individuals, or simply the average 
wage paid to a changing mix of workers and occupations. This makes it 
hard to interpret what certain wage trends mean. Douty (1980) reports 
that the percentage by  which the average hourly  earnings of  skilled 
workers in manufacturing exceeded that for unskilled workers fell from 
105 percent in 1907 to 31 percent in 1976. He points out that this decline 
could represent  a narrowing of  differentials, or it could represent  an 
upgrading of the skills expected of  unskilled workers, or a downgrading 
of  the skills expected by skilled workers. As an example of  the possible 
upgrading of unskilled workers, he points out that seventy-five  years ago 
they were  not expected  to read  or be familiar with machinery; they 
worked with simple tools, if  any, often using strength to move materials. 
Today’s unskilled worker in manufacturing may perform work that would 
have been semiskilled seventy-five  years ago. As old jobs were eliminated 
and new ones created, the very concept of  unskilled work gradually 
changed until it is now quite different from before. There is no way to be 
sure which of  the wage measures, including the unweighted average 
hourly earnings, provides the best measure of  wage change over such 
long periods. 
Over the business cycle, it is extremely important that a fixed-weight 
measure of occupational wage rates be reported. Macroeconomic theory 
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are. Empirical estimates of the cyclical variation of wages are found in the 
large-scale econometric models and have been used as a basis for policy 
by every administration since Nixon’s. Most of these estimates are based 
on the Hourly Earnings Index which holds constant the weights of large 
manufacturing groupings and corrects for overtime premiums. But many 
changes in the composition of  the work force take place over the cycle 
that can affect the rate of wage inflation reported by this index. In a recent 
paper, Nichols (1981), I showed that cyclical wage variation is substan- 
tially less in the wage indexes derived from the Professional, Administra- 
tive, and Clerical Wage (PATC) survey than it is in the Hourly Earnings 
Index.*  Why this is true could not be resolved, but one possibility is that 
the fixed-weight PATC survey provides a more accurate measure of 
cyclical change than the unweighted Hourly Earnings Index. The issue of 
cyclical wage variability remains of crucial importance to macroeconomic 
policy, and macroeconomists should be prepared for the possibility that 
what  they  have come to regard as the normal  response  of  wages to 
recession may simply be the result of the effect of the cycle on the weights 
of  the Hourly Earnings Index. Short-run macroeconomic models may 
rely too heavily on the past behavior of  average hourly earnings. 
14.2  Nonhourly Compensation 
Theoretical  and  empirical work  in  economics has  been  organized 
around the hour as a measure of labor input. Compensation is divided by 
hours worked to get a measure of  the cost of  each unit of  labor input. 
Some forms of  compensation do not  lend  themselves easily to such 
computations. Several are discussed here. 
14.2.1  Incentive Pay 
Incentive pay arrangements are quite common in manufacturing. They 
pose an enormous problem for wage measurement. They also pose a 
problem for a wage stabilization agency. In some occupations, technical 
progress or increases in the amount of  capital used per worker permit 
great increases in productivity, while in other occupations no increase is 
possible. One would expect that competition would normally keep com- 
pensation at roughly equal levels for work of  equal difficulty, and this 
means that those occupations paid on an incentive basis but with no 
chance for an improvement in productivity should get an annual enrich- 
ment of  the incentive formula to keep them abreast of  the occupations 
where compensation grows automatically with productivity.  In other 
cases, improvements in production methods require the formulas to be 
revised downward periodically. The question arises how CWPS can tell in 
advance which occupations would normally expect an improvement in 
the incentive formula, which would expect a decline, and which would 
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CWPS denied all improvements in incentive formulas. On the other 
hand, they did not force any formulas to decline and, therefore, permit- 
ted any increase in compensation that took place as a result of an increase 
in productivity. This was clearly inequitable on the face of  it, but it was 
felt there was really no option since the wage measurement issue was so 
difficult. Mills (1975) points out that the same decision was reached by 
wage stabilization authorities during World War 11, the Korean War, and 
the Nixon controls. He concludes, “This review of historical experience 
suggests that, because incentive plans are very much specific to individual 
plants and industries, boards should handle them largely on a case-by- 
case basis.” (Mills 1975, p. 201) 
A case-by-case treatment may be feasible for a large controls program. 
It is not a sound approach for collecting wage data outside the purview of 
a controls program. The BLS must measure the increase in the wage rates 
attached to specific occupations, many of which are paid on an incentive 
basis. They cannot assign numbers by judgment to each observation in 
their  sample.  This is  not  a problem  for the average hourly earnings 
measure of  wages where total compensation is simply divided by  total 
hours. But it is a problem for an index of  occupational wages like the 
Employment Cost Index. 
Research is needed on the nature of  incentive compensation. How 
prevalent is it? How much of the normal increase in compensation earned 
by workers on incentive scales is due to an enrichment of the scales and 
how much to increased productivity? Can the variation in the source of 
these increases across different industries be attributed to any economic 
characteristics? The answers to these questions are of  interest to those 
who measure wages for research purposes and to those who measure 
them for stabilization programs. 
A less common form of  incentive pay are bonuses linked to the firm’s 
financial performance. CWPS treated these in the same way  as piece 
rates-any  enrichment of  the bonus schedule was  counted as a pay 
increase; any increase in compensation due to better performance of the 
firm was permitted. However, firms without well-defined formulas link- 
ing performance to bonuses were denied the chance to increase bonus 
compensation by more than 7 percent. Since the economy improved after 
the guidelines were installed in October 1978, many of  these firms prob- 
ably experienced an improvement in profits and under normal circum- 
stances would  have increased  bonuses by  more than  7  percent.  But 
because  of  the element  of  discretion  in  their  bonus  procedure, this 
normal practice was denied by CWPS. 
14.2.2  Future Value Compensation 
Future value compensation poses two conceptual wage measurement 
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desired measure of labor cost? Second, how should an ex ante measure- 
ment be made if  one is necessary? CWPS could not use  an ex post 
measurement since firms wished to be told in advance whether a com- 
pensation agreement they were about to sign was in compliance. And for 
benefits such as pensions, not only was it clearly impractical for CWPS to 
wait and count the payments that were actually collected by workers, but 
the BLS also needs to have a way of  estimating their value in advance. 
Pension agreements are of  two major kinds: defined benefit and de- 
fined contribution.  Defined contribution plans pose no measurement 
issue for CWPS or BLS. The firm agrees to put a defined amount of 
money aside for its workers who will collect the invested proceeds of this 
money at the time they retire. The amount of  money being put aside 
under a defined contribution plan is clearly part of labor cost. But defined 
benefit plans have formulas that link the promised pension to the work- 
er’s employment and wage history. Actuarial assumptions, investment 
performance, and government regulations determine how much must be 
put aside today to meet the promises implied by the formula. 
Query: Under a defined benefit plan, is labor cost increased when the 
firm enriches the formula or when it increases its rate of contribution into 
the fund that finances the given formula? CWPS permitted firms to use 
either method without penalty. Under its average hourly earnings mea- 
sure of wage increase, all current outlays for benefits were counted as part 
of  labor cost. A firm could adopt this method regardless of any changes 
made in its formula. But CWPS permitted an exception for firms that had 
to raise their rates of  contribution as long as they didn’t enrich their 
formulas. Such an increase could be due to a bad investment experience 
that caused the fund to fall below the level the actuaries deemed to be 
safe,  or it  could  result  from  an  ERISA regulation  that required  an 
increase so the fund could reach some minimum level, or it could be due 
to a change in actuarial methods or assumptions. 
Examples of  these possibilities pose interesting issues of  labor cost 
measurement for the BLS or for researchers. If a company must raise its 
contribution rate because of bad investment experience on the pension 
fund’s portfolio, is that an increase in compensation and labor cost? I 
propose that for research purposes, no labor cost increase should be 
counted in this case. The reason is that the firm can be viewed as being 
engaged in two activities: (1)  making things with labor and (2) gambling 
on the securities market. Its losses in the second activity should not be 
counted as a cost for the first. The market price of labor is unchanged by 
this. New workers can still be hired at the old rates. It is only the amount 
the firm has to put aside to meet that price that has been increased. 
An interesting complication of  this example arises if  the union runs a 
multiemployer pension  fund  and the firms merely contribute defined 
amounts to it. The Teamsters, for example, receive defined contributions 458  Donald A. Nichols 
from firms but promise defined benefits to their members. Successful 
investing is required if the contributions are to be sufficient to cover the 
benefits. But before the 1979 negotiations, the Teamsters had invested 
pension assets in Las Vegas real estate and lost some of the fund’s money. 
Trucking firms were asked to raise their rate of  contribution to the fund 
though  employee benefits were  not  to be  enriched  by  the increase. 
Query: Did Teamster compensation increase as a result of the increased 
contributions? CWPS, in a famous decision, said no, thereby permitting 
the Teamster contract to slide through the wage standard. What should 
BLS say in such a case? 
I feel that a strong case can be made to keep all aspects of investment 
experience out of the measures of  compensation. Profits or losses on a 
pension fund’s investments should be treated like profits and losses in 
other activities of  the firm. While they may appear in funds that have 
been segregated into an account for employees, as long as they do not 
affect the price the firm would have to pay to hire new labor, they are not 
a part of  labor cost. Yet, in the Teamster case, a new employee would 
entail a higher pension cost under the new agreement even though this 
higher cost was necessary only to make up for past losses. Multiemployer 
funds are clearly a complicated issue. 
A change in government regulation has more significance for CWPS 
than for researchers. During the CWPS program, a regulation came into 
effect defining equal pay for equal work to mean women had to receive 
the same pension formula promised to men despite their greater longev- 
ity. This meant that firms could expect to pay more to hire a woman than a 
man for the same job. Firms that had provided less generous pension 
formulas for women (though of equal expected value to those provided to 
men) had to increase their rate of contribution to the fund when women 
were promised the same formula as men. CWPS made these increased 
contributions exempt from the 7 percent standard. Since the increases 
raised  both  the expected  cost  to firms and the expected  receipts  of 
workers, they should be counted as increased labor cost by BLS. While 
standards of  social equity might define equal pay to mean an identical 
formula of  defined benefits, researchers should note that the expected 
pay of  female workers was higher than that for men as a result of  the 
regulation. 
Changes in actuarial assumptions provide a similar problem. If  the 
change is due to a new estimate of  longevity, we might say that the old 
formula had been discovered to be more generous than expected. Main- 
taining this formula would then provide an increase in expected com- 
pensation. On the other hand, a change in actuarial methods might lead 
to an increased rate of  contribution with  no change in the expected 
benefits. This latter change is simply a change in the timing of payments 
intQ the fund and not in their expected value. They should not be counted 
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Because pension payments will take place in the distant future, an 
estimate of  their present value must be generated. Other future value 
compensation benefits have more immediate implications and pose a 
different problem. An employer who self-insures  his medical benefits and 
is then caught by an epidemic in the town of his major plant finds his labor 
cost increased. Should researchers treat an increase in the hospitalization 
of workers’ children as an increase in labor cost? The expected cost of 
hiring new labor in the market is unchanged. The compensation expected 
to be paid to existing workers after the epidemic is unchanged. Probably 
it is best to include only the expected value of medical benefits as a labor 
cost rather than the actual payment. Differences between the expected 
and  actual  costs can  be  attributed  to the firm being in  the medical 
insurance business rather than to its need to hire labor. It is a loss on 
another activity of the firm, and not a cost of hiring labor. Martin David’s 
paper in this volume makes the same point. 
14.2.3  Stock Options 
Stock options, granted primarily to executives, combine several of 
these conceptual problems. The option is of  uncertain future value, and 
the size of the option may vary with the firm’s economic circumstances. In 
this case the option would combine the characteristics of incentive com- 
pensation with those of  future value compensation. The expected value 
of the option would have to be computed in advance to know the amount 
of  compensation for determining compliance with the pay  standard. 
Since the option may extend for years into the future, even measures of 
compensation for the year past would have to have a way of estimating its 
value. Stock options of short-term duration are traded on exchanges, and 
their prices may provide a basis for an ex ante evaluation of the options 
granted to executives by firms. Formulas have been worked out for the 
actuarial value of  an option, and these could be used to  provide an ex ante 
estimate of  the likely value of  an untraded option. 
14.2.4  Cost-of-Living Adjustments 
Finally, cost-of-living  adjustments (COLA) provide a knotty problem. 
The McMenamin-Russell paper claims that the COLA issue, more than 
any other, caused the downfall of the wage stabilization program. CWPS 
had to provide an ex ante evaluation of  the COLA to determine com- 
pliance. This was done by  using an estimate of  6 percent as the likely 
increase in the Consumer Price Index in future years. From the perspec- 
tive of mid-1978, this estimate was not as bad as it appears with hindsight, 
since the December-to-December inflation rates for 1976 and 1977 had 
been 4.8 and 6.8 percent, respectively. A  minor  decline in inflation 
because of  the program could have brought about a 6 percent inflation 
rate, a number thought to be consistent with the 7percent wage standard. 
But what transpired was a 9 percent inflation rate in 1978 and a 13.3 460  Donald A. Nichols 
percent rate in 1979. Workers who had bargained for a full COLA plus a 1 
percent wage increase were credited with a total increase of 7 percent by 
CWPS, whereas the striking of such a bargain in December 1978 would 
have led to an actual wage increase of 14.3  percent. This inequity brought 
down the system. 
How does the COLA issue effect wage measurement for purposes of 
research? The issue resembles those posed by other kinds of future value 
compensation. Workers have shifted an uncertainty over future events to 
employers who not only pay the workers an agreed wage but who insure 
them against inflation. Regardless of  one’s view of  the process of  infla- 
tion, there are two different ways a COLA can affect a worker’s wage. 
First, there is the common equal increase in wage and price inflation that 
can take place as a result of an unanticipated increase in demand. In the 
absence of a COLA, a multiyear wage agreement would imply substan- 
tially different levels of real wages if  different macroeconomic policies 
were followed subsequent to the signing of  the agreement. The COLA 
insures both the worker and the firm against changes in overall inflation 
so that real compensation can be independent of  it. 
The second effect of  a COLA is to insure a worker’s future real wage 
regardless of  changes in relative prices. A bad harvest, for example, 
normally reduces real wages. Macroeconomists might not agree whether 
this decline would normally be manifested in an increase in the rate of 
price inflation or a reduction in the rate of wage inflation. But whichever 
would transpire, a full COLA would guarantee a worker’s real wage 
though it would not guarantee the real burden to be paid by  the em- 
ployer. In this second sense, a COLA is similar to medical insurance 
where variations in the worker’s benefits are accompanied by variations 
in the firm’s  real labor cost. In this case, the worker is insured against the 
possibility of  a bad harvest. Wage increases granted to keep up with a 
common wage-price inflation can be thought of  as part of what the firm 
would have to pay for labor in the open market. Insurance against a bad 
harvest that temporarily causes food prices to be high is a benefit, like 
medical insurance, whose expected value might be counted as a part of 
the going price  of  labor, but  whose  actual  payments  also include a 
random element. I see no easy way  to separate these two effects in 
practice. 
14.3  Collective Bargaining Agreements 
The percentage increase in compensation attributed to a single collec- 
tive bargaining  agreement requires, in many cases, a solution to the 
problems noted above. Evaluating an agreement in which shift, seniority, 
or skill differentials are changed, or in which incentive formulas are 
changed, perhaps in response to increased productivity under the old 461  Wage Measurement Questions Raised by an Incomes Policy 
formulas,  or in  which  fringe  benefits  of  uncertain  future  value  are 
changed,  requires  answers to the above questions. In principle,  the 
percentage increase attributed to the agreement is an index of  the in- 
creases for the various occupations whose wages and benefits are covered 
by  the agreement. They do not measure wage increases of  individuals 
moving up a job ladder but of the upward movement of the ladder itself. 
BLS publishes statistics on new collective bargaining agreements with- 
out estimating the size of  the COLA benefits. The agreements are clas- 
sified into two groups, those with COLAs and those without.  These 
statistics would be of greater use if  estimates of the value of  the COLAs 
were included. But what estimates of  future inflation should BLS use in 
pricing COLAs? The experience of  CWPS warns against the use of  a 
single measure, particularly one with political significance. Instead, three 
or four estimates might be provided. An example would be of inflation at 
rates of 4,8,  or 12 percent and possibly at the actual rate of the preceding 
twelve months. The reader could then provide his own interpolation to 
arrive at an estimate corresponding to his own inflation forecast. Readers 
can’t do this at present because of the complicated limitations on COLAs 
that exist-minima,  maxima, partial coverage, and so on. If the alterna- 
tive estimates were provided, researchers could generate forecasts of 
inflation in any way they wished to provide estimates of  the expected 
wage increases contained in the contracts with COLAs. 
14.4  Conclusion 
I have pointed out a few issues raised by a wage stabilization program 
that are also of  importance for wage measurement and, therefore, for 
research  that  makes use  of  wage  data.  Wage stabilization programs 
generate mountains of correspondence with the private sector. Indeed, I 
contributed  several  letters myself  during  the  recent  CWPS program 
containing questions that had been asked of  me when I had lectured 
about the program to the private sector. 
An interesting research project would be to search the CWPS file of 
correspondence for questions about how wages are to be measured for 
purposes of  compliance. The record of  CWPS’ decisions on the issues 
raised  by  that  correspondence, or, indeed, of  any wage stabilization 
board’s decisions, would provide insight into many subtle wage measure- 
ment issues whose resolution can have a fundamental effect on our view 
of how the economy works. Important among these questions are issues 
about the level of productivity and resource growth over time and the 
extent and nature of wage flexibility. These are among the fundamental 
research issues of  our time. Accurate measurement is essential to their 
early and sound resolution. 462  Donald A. Nichols 
Notes 
1. The author participated in the design of  the Carter wage and price standards in 1978 
2. An example of  the PATC wage indexes can be found in Bureau ofLabor Statistics 
when he was deputy assistant secretary of  labor for economic policy and research. 
(1980), p. 7. 
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